SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION

Israel
ST D-2/1

(7)

May 14, 1953
11:00 a.m.

(E)

B-1 EB ED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY V WOLF JR DATE 5/22/82
RDS☐or XDS☐EXT. DATE
TS AUTH. ISBEN(8)
ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS
DECLASSIFIED☐ RE-CLASSIFIED☐
RELEASE DENIED☒
PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS B-1 EB ED

SUBJECT: Israel

PLACE : Office of the Prime Minister, Jerusalem

Participants: United States
Mr. John Foster Dulles
Mr. Harold E. Stassen
Mr. Francis H. Russell

Israel
Mr. David Ben Gurion, Prime Minister

[redacted]

EXCISE

Prime Minister Ben Gurion expressed hope that the Secretary's mission, including objective of winning Arab friendship, would prove success, and commented as follows on Soviet threat, Israel's potential role in Middle East defense, United States role in Middle East and Israel-Arab relations.

[redacted]

B-1 EB ED

[redacted]

B-1 EB ED

[redacted]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY V WOLF JR DATE 5/22/82
PORTIONS DENIED AS INDICATED

SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION



In reply to Prime Minister, Secretary stated he had come to listen and learn, was familiar with Israel's history and present creative activity, admired both and felt they created feeling of common debt in which was more binding than formal treaty of alliance. Agreeing Soviet peace overtures merely tactic, which could hardly be otherwise in view Soviet ideology and belief that harmony only possible in wholly Communist world, Secretary urged need to be on guard, particularly against danger permitting Soviet tactics divide free world. While United States believes in testing willingness USSR make concessions and is prepared workout accomodation with Soviet Union, does not believe few kind words change

Communist

Communist doctrine. Citing absence assurances of armistice in Korea, attack on Indochina, indications from disposition Soviet Forces of potential buildup in East Germany, Secretary stressed that situation still dangerous and confronts free world with problem matching Soviets strength without losing essential freedoms. In this connection, underscored that nothing United States is doing should be interpreted as reflecting United States belief Soviet threat less dangerous. United States carrying forward planning started last December prior Stalin's death. Basic objective that planning, Secretary pointed out, misuse of United States productivity to sustain military strength over long period without weakening economy. Decisions taken at NATO were consistent with that objective: In order eliminate possibility economic collapse, costs reduced by concentrating on build-up of quality rather than quantity.

Regarding the Prime Minister's opening remarks, Secretary stated he was impressed with good wishes for success of mission in winning friendship of Arabs and wished to comment frankly. Expressed conviction that without goodwill and confidence of Arabs United States would not be able to play useful role in area. Explained that Arabs feel Roosevelt and Truman administration so subject to Jewish influence that Arab viewpoint ignored. Decisions often taken under pressure United States Jewish groups which felt they had right exercise influence because of contributions to election victory. New administration, Secretary pointed out, was elected by overwhelming vote of American people as whole and neither owes that type of political debt to any segment nor believes in building power by cultivating particular segments of populations.

Called attention to belief President Eisenhower that while United States' policy must continue support for Israel as great creative achievement which has evoked sympathy of American people, must also make Arabs realize United States concern for them. States his belief Prime Minister would agree best interests Israel would be served by healthier, friendlier United States-Arab relations. One of major obstacles to improving environment United States-Arab relations, Secretary indicated, was group in United States which feels anything done for Arabs is necessarily contrary Israel interests. Because of activities this group and of pro-Arab group there is strong feeling that United States policy must either be pro-Israel or pro-Arab and cannot be both. Referring to Foreign Minister Sharett's remarks previous day on kind of peace Israel sought, Secretary stated that while there might be disagreement on tactics and details there appear to be no fundamental differences; United States sympathetic and would like to see Israel obtain substantially kind of peace it sought. But suggested would be futile in view fanatical emotionalism of Arabs for United States to support such peace merely as advocate of Israel. Arabs feel that new administration is opportunity improve relations with United States and one of purposes of trip is to indicate United States interest in them. Ability accomplish this purpose may depend on understanding of United States Jews, Secretary stated, and

suggested

suggested that Prime Minister might be able to help United States to help Israel in this regard.

Summing up United States approach Secretary indicated United States not trying set right all wrongs of world, did not desire interfere where not wanted and where cannot be helpful. But United States had influence, was concerned with peace in world, with conflicts in non-Communist world which could weaken free world in face Communist threat, and would like to see breaches healed. Urging confidence in friendly attitude United States and reaffirming United States sympathy for Israel, Secretary indicated that "if United States efforts to be of assistance in area are considered unfriendly to Israel, if they are misunderstood by United States Jews, if they lead to internal difficulties in United States, then United States "would have to permit events in area to take their course".

[redacted]

In conversation with Sharett at dinner previous evening, Secretary expressed hope Foreign Ministry would not be [redacted] on trip designed improve climate in area. [redacted] Secretary added he would, of course, have to [redacted] position on Jerusalem for some time subsequent.